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INHERENT POWER FOUND, RULE 11 LOST: TAKING
A SHORTCUT TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS IN
CHAMBERS v. NASCO*
INTRODUCTION

A court's authority to regulate the conduct of those who
appear before it is essential to the maintenance of an orderly
system of justice. Accordingly, federal courts have numerous
sanction mechanisms at their disposal for those instances
when a litigant has acted in a manner that evinces a callous
disregard for the sanctity and authority of the court. These
mechanisms come in several forms. Congress has provided
statutory authority principally in 28 U.S.C. section 1927 ("section 1927").' By contrast, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("Rule 11")2 is promulgated by the Supreme Court
111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
Section 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court in
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the
court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1989).
2 At the time Chambers was decided Rule 11 provided:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by
an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by
rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of
an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not
interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
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under authority provided by Congress in the Rules Enabling
Act.' A final source of authority to punish litigants for improper practices is found in the inherent powers of the judiciary.
Unlike the two preceding it, this third source of authority is
not embodied in codified law but is derived from the equity
powers of the judiciary.4 The Supreme Court has described
these powers as "[clertain implied powers [that] must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their
institution ....[They] are powers which cannot be dispensed
with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of
all others . . . ." Thus, implied powers concern not only the

authority to sanction litigants, but also those matters that are
considered procedural or house-keeping as well as other traditional equity powers of courts.6 Indeed, the inherent power is
a broad form of implied power that permits courts to act in a
manner consistent with their judicial authority.
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation
of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (emphasis added). Rule 11 has since been amended. See infra
note 213 and accompanying text.
' The Rules Enabling Act provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United
States district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof)
and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for
the purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1992).
4 GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE §
25, at 371 (1989); see also Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-31 (1962) (noting that a court's inherent authority to dismiss actions with prejudice for failure
to prosecute had its origins in bills in equity).
' United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). The question the
Court faced in Hudson was whether the circuit courts could exercise a common
law jurisdiction in criminal cases. Id. at 32. The Court concluded that although
certain implied powers are necessary, "all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases ... is not within their implied powers." Id. at 34.
' See infra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
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In Chambers v. NASCO,7 the Supreme Court considered
the interplay between a codified provision and the inherent
power to sanction. The defendant had engaged in a protracted,
bad-faith effort to prevent the plaintiff from enforcing a valid
contract, both through court proceedings and malicious out-ofcourt acts.8 The district court determined that some of the
conduct violated codified sanction provisions such as Rule 11
and section 1927. In imposing sanctions, however, the court
relied entirely on its inherent power to sanction attorneys for
bad-faith conduct.9 Like the circuit court, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's reasoning. In essence, the Court
concluded that federal courts are not obligated to apply codified sanction provisions when not all of the conduct is
sanctionable under such provisions if requiring a district court
to apply statutory or rule-based sanctions before resorting to
its inherent power would result in loss of expediency."
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's arguments
in favor of a broad inherent power that district courts can use
to the exclusion of applicable statutory and rule-based sanctioning mechanisms, and concludes that the Court's present
analysis is plainly inconsistent with its own prior decisions.
111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
at 2128. For example, Chambers and his attorney tried to "place the

8 Id.

property at issue beyond the reach of the District Court by means of the Louisiana Public Records Doctrine." Id. The contract at issue, a purchase agreement,
had never been recorded. Thus, Chambers and his attorney determined that if
they sold the property to a third party and recorded the deeds before the issuance
of a temporary restraining order, the court would lack jurisdiction. The pair created a trust with Chambers' sister as its trustee and directed the execution of warranty deeds conveying the tracts to the trust. The trustee did not sign the deeds
and no consideration was paid. When the judge telephoned Chambers' attorney to
inquire about a possible sale, he made no mention of the deeds which he had just
recorded. Id. at 2128-29.
' Id. at 2131. Although the Court found that sanctions were not appropriate
under Rule 11 or § 1927, it determined that sanctions were appropriate under a
court's inherent power especially "when the offending parties have practiced a
fraud upon the court." Id. (quoting NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc.,
124 F.R.D. 120, 139 (W.D. La. 1989)).
10 Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2135. The Court expressed its opinion by stating:
[Wihen there is bad-faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be
adequately sanctioned under the rules, the court ordinarily should rely on
the rules rather than the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the court, neither the statute nor the rules are up to the task,
the court may safely rely on its inherent power.
Id. at 2136.
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Those decisions indicate that the inherent power should not be
used in a manner inconsistent with the application of rules
and statutes. The majority also disregarded longstanding rules
of statutory interpretation which would have required the
application of Rule 11 sanctions in Chambers. Similarly, the
Court paid little notice to the potential Erie Doctrine problems
attending an overly broad application of this inherent power.
Specifically, it appears that the district court disregarded
Louisiana's prohibition on the imposition of punitive damages
for bad-faith breach of contract when it punished the defendant for his initial prelitigation transgressions.
Part I of this Comment examines the historical background and Supreme Court precedent concerning the nature
and scope of a trial court's inherent powers. Part II next reviews the facts and the procedural history of the Chambers
litigation. Part III then argues that through its misapplication
of precedent, the Supreme Court has succeeded in vastly expanding this form of equitable authority. Finally, Part IV recommends an approach to the application of inherent power
sanctions that achieves a balance between providing courts
with sufficient authority to punish improper conduct and respecting the very limited nature of this equitable authority.
I.

BACKGROUND: THE INHERENT POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY

A. Inherent Power Generally
Historically, the rule in the United States has been that
the prevailing party in a litigation ordinarily is not entitled to
collect his or her attorneys' fees from the losing party except as
provided for by statute.11 This prohibition on fee-shifting,
" Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); see,
e.g., Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (in rejecting a $1600 allowance for attorneys' fees, the Court stated that '[the general practice of the United
States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not strictly correct in
principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified,
by statute"); see also F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974); Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 717-18 (1967); Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187 (1878); Flanders v.
Tweed, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 450 (1872); OeIrichs v. Spain, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211
(1872); Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
Unlike the American Rule, under the "European Rule" (which is applied in
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commonly known as the American Rule, is largely an outgrowth of developments that occurred in the practice of formulating attorneys' fees during the post-colonial period and into
the late nineteenth century. 2 The Supreme Court has observed various policy considerations underlying the American
Rule. First, a party "should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit."1 3 Second, "'the poor might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponents' counsel.""' 4 Third, courts are often faced with difficulties in determining what constitutes reasonable attorneys'
fees. 5 Finally, the principle of independent advocacy is potentially threatened by providing a financial link between the
bench and the bar. 6
Although the American Rule is well established, federal
courts nonetheless have formulated exceptions that allow the
awarding of attorneys' fees in certain limited circumstances,
despite the absence of any codified law permitting such
awards.' These exceptions have their basis in Supreme Court
precedent dating from 1812, which asserts that federal courts
possess certain inherent powers.' In the early case of United

England) courts historically have been authorized to award attorneys' fees to a
successful litigant. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247 n.18.
2 See John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee
Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1984). During the early post-colonial

period, the amount an attorney could charge his client in the form of fees was, at
least theoretically, strictly limited. Supported by free-market and laissez-faire principles, however, courts and legislatures began to accept that the measure of compensation was a matter best left to the agreement between attorney and client. Id.
at 18. Leubsdorf suggests that this evident departure from prior practice stemmed
from several reasons, including the growing influence of lawyers, the desire of
businessmen to retain the best lawyers, and, a possible decline in the intensity of
the anti-lawyer feeling. Id. at 17. As a result, Congress and state legislatures
became increasingly unwilling to allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees from the
opposing party, despite the lack of a clear reason. Id. at 21-23. Courts soon began
to adhere to this general rule without evincing a willingness to justify it. Id. at
23.
13 F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129 (citing Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 718).
' Id. (quoting Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 718).
Id. (citing Fleishmann, 386 U.S. at 718).
,o Id. For further discourse on the reasoning behind the general prohibition on
fee shifting, see generally Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 261.
17 See, e.g., F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129; Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527
(1962); cf Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
18 See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33 (1812) (finding that
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States v. Hudson,1 9 the Court noted that "[c]ertain implied
powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from
the nature of their institution."0 These inherent powers are
"governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve
the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."2 1 They also
seek to protect the sanctity of the judiciary and its proceedings.2 2

courts have "an implied power to preserve [their] own existence and promote the
end and object of [their] creation"). English courts had come to recognize such an
equitable power at an even earlier point. See, e.g., Ex parte Simpson, 33 Eng.
Rep. 834 (1809) (awarding fees for filing an irrelevant affidavit); Dungey v.
Angove, 30 Eng. Rep. 644 (1794) (equity court awarded fees for vexatious litigation
through its inherent authority to ensure that justice is achieved); Ladd v. Wright,
72 Eng. Rep. 800 (1601) (awarding fees "pur le unjust vexacom").
9 Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32.
20 Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 34; see also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973)
(courts possess "inherent equitable power[s]").
21 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962).
See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59
(1985) ("[A] court may assess attorneys' fees for 'willful disobedience of a court
order' . . . or when the losing party has 'acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons . . . .'") (citations omitted).
In fact, this inherent judicial power is best viewed as consisting of three distinct categories of power. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 562 (3d
Cir. 1985). First, federal courts have the inherent authority to exercise their Article III powers. Id. This aspect of inherent power "encompasses an extremely narrow range of authority involving activity so fundamental to the essence of a court
as a constitutional tribunal that to divest the court of absolute command within
this sphere is really to render practically meaningless the terms 'court and Judicial power." Id. This strand of inherent power, grounded in the framework of the
separation of powers among the several branches of government, empowers courts
to disregard legislation that is inconsistent with it. See, e.g., State ex rel. Bushman v. Vandenberg, 280 P.2d 344 (Or. 1955) (voiding legislation providing for the
automatic disqualification of judges simply upon the application of a party);
Vaughan v. Harp, 4 S.W. 751 (Ark. 1887) (voiding legislation requiring a written
opinion in every case).
Second, federal courts possess inherent power to fulfill their housekeeping and
procedural needs. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563. The Eash court noted that this category
of inherent judicial power is based not only on necessity but also on practicality.
Id. For example, the Supreme Court has determined that courts possess inherent
power to supply themselves with auditors to aid in decisionmaking. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). "Courts [also] have (at least in the absence of
legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
instruments" such as appointing "persons ... to aid judges in the performance of
specific judicial duties . . . ." Id. at 312; see Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Schwimmer v. United States,
232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
Finally, and most importantly for the issue in Chambers, federal courts possess inherent powers that are said to arise from the nature of the court, Eash,
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Using these inherent powers, courts have claimed that
judicially fashioned exceptions to the American Rule "inhere"
in the nature of the judicial entity and are vested in the courts
upon their creation.' Thus, when the awarding of attorneys'
fees falls under the rubric of inherent power, the necessity to
act under statutory authority is displaced.24 Specifically, the
Supreme Court has held that courts possess the inherent power to assess attorneys' fees for the willful disobedience of a
court order.' Attorneys' fees may also be awarded when a
party has acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons. " " Fees may be further shifted when a
successful litigant "has conferred a substantial benefit on a
class of persons and the court's shifting of fees operates to
spread the cost proportionately among the members of the
benefited class."27 Several circuit courts have also recognized
that such awards are permitted on the basis of the "private
attorney general" rationale.28 This final exception acknowledges that equitable concerns may require such fee-shifting "based
on the premise that the expense of litigation may often be a
formidable if not insurmountable obstacle to the private litiga-

757 F.2d at 562, and are "necessary to the exercise of all others." Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) at 34; see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)
(quoting Hudson). For example, the power to hold a party in contempt, although
now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 401 and at Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42,
historically has been considered "the most prominent of these powers." Eash, 757
F.2d at 562. Similarly, the power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute is considered to be an inherent power. Link, 370 U.S. at 629-30. A court also
may assess attorneys' fees for the obstruction of a court order. Toledo Scale Co. v.
Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
Eash, 757 F.2d at 561.
2 See id.; Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. P., M. & D. Ry.,
266 U.S. 42, 66 (1924); see also Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing
Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967) ("Limited exceptions to the American [Riule
have . . . been sanctioned by this Court when overriding considerations of justice
seemed to compel such a result.").
25 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258; Fleischmann, 356 U.S. at 718; Toledo Scale, 261
U.S. at 426-28.
"' F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Indus. Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974); Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59 (quoting F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129).
F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 130; see Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-9 (1973)
(respondents suit under Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act vindicated not only his own rights but rendered a substantial service to union and its
members as well); cf. Peter Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation,
48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1973).
2 F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 130.
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tion necessary to enforce important public policies."2 9
That a court may assess attorney fees as a penalty for badfaith conduct is not controversial." It is the power to sanction
bad-faith conduct that was at issue in Chambers. The Supreme
Court, however, has never formulated a comprehensive standard for identifying conduct that justifies the imposition of
penalties under the bad faith exception."' One legal commentator, Professor Gregory Joseph, suggests that "inherent power
sanctions may be imposed only when there is clear evidence
that the challenged actions were entirely without color and
made for reasons of harassment, delay or other improper purpose."32 In addition, while attorneys' fees appear to be the
2 Id.; see, e.g., Cooper v. Allen, 467 F.2d 836, 841 (5th Cir. 1972) (in § 1982
civil rights suit, attorneys' fees ordinarily awarded "to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief); see also Northcross v. Board
of Educ. of the Memphis City Schs., 412 U.S. 427 (1973); Newman v. Piggie Park
Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400 (1968); Knight v. Anciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972).
The Supreme Court itself, however, has not applied the private attorney general
rationale. F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 130; Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General:" Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public
Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973).
"0F.D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 129. The bad faith exception applies to both plaintiffs
and defendants regardless of whether they were successful in the underlying litigation. The Alyeska Court used the term "losing party." Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258.
The Chambers Court made it clear, however, that there should be no difference
which party to a litigation acted in bad faith when determining whether to sanction the conduct because the policy serves the procedural purposes of vindicating
judicial authority as well as reimbursing the party who was forced to expend energies to repel a meritless litigious assault. See Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S. Ct.
2123, 2135 (1991).
1 The dissent in Chambers criticized the majority for its evident failure to
establish a comprehensive framework by which courts and litigants alike could
determine whether the conduct in question fell within the auspices of the bad
faith exception. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2142, 2145 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
2 JOSEPH, supra note 4, § 26(B), at 388. Recognizing the strongly punitive
nature of imposing sanctions under such circumstances, the Second Circuit has
established a fairly stringent standard for determining what constitutes bad-faith
conduct. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 80 (2d Cir. 1982) (requiring a "high degree of specificity in the factual findings of lower courts when
attorneys' fees are awarded on the basis of bad faith . . . and that there be 'clear
evidence' that the challenged actions 'are entirely without color and [are taken] for
reasons of harassment delay or for other improper purposes'") (second alteration in
original) (citations omitted). The Weinberger court went on to indicate that these
requirements would ensure that "persons with colorable claims [would] not be
deterred from pursuing their rights by the fear of an award of attorneys' fees
against them." Id. at 80-81; accord Autorama Corp. v. Stewart, 802 F.2d 1284,
1288 (10th Cir. 1986) ("Clearly, courts are quite hesitant to find claims were pursued in bad faith unless the evidence is remarkably supportive of such a proposi-
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sanction of choice where bad-faith conduct is concerned, they
are by no means the exclusive remedy available to a court. One
noted scholar, Gregory Joseph, indicates that courts may
33
choose from among the following types of sanctions: imposition of a fine,34 disqualification of counsel,35 preclusion of
claims, defenses or evidence, 36 dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute,37 entry of a default judgment,38 suspension
of counsel from practice before the court or disbarment, 39 vacation of judgment,4" injunctive relief limiting a litigant's future access to the courts41 or citation for contempt.42 In sum,
the inherent power to sanction litigants and their counsel
provides courts with a readily adaptable means of tailoring an
appropriate remedy, but one that should be limited to circumstances warranting its application.

tion."); see also JOSEPH, supra note 4, § 26(B), at 388-91.
Litigants need not prove subjective bad faith but it may be inferred from the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct in question. See generally
JOSEPH, supra note 4, § 26(B), at 390. Nor are they limited to punishing conduct
that occurs within the confines of the courtroom. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 530-31 (1962) (where respondent shipowner ignored petitioner
seaman's claims for cost of medical care so that petitioner was forced to hire a
lawyer to recover medical costs, award of attorneys' fees appropriate); accord
Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 29. An award of attorneys' fees under such circumstances "vindicates judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions
available for contempt of court and makes the prevailing party whole for expenses
caused by his opponent's obstinacy." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1970); cf
First Nael Bank v. Dunham, 471 F.2d 712 (8th Cir. 1973).
See generally JOSEPH, supra note 4.
3' See, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1557 n.6 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
banc) (monetary sanctions); Kleiner v. First Nat'l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193,
1209 (11th Cir. 1985) (sanctions include monetary penalties payable to the clerk of
the court"); Titus v. Mercedes Benz of N. Am., 695 F.2d 746, 749 n.6 (3d Cir.
1982) (fine).
Kleiner, 751 F.2d at 1209-10.
Titus, 695 F.2d at 749 n.6.
Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985); Link v.
Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962).
38 Donaldson, 819 F.2d at 1557 n.6; Eash, 757 F.2d at 561.
3 Eash, 757 F.2d at 561; Titus, 695 F.2d at 749 n.6.
4 Brockton Savings Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchel & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11 (1st
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986).
41 In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1258-59, 1262-64 (2d Cir. 1984).
42 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Brockton, 771 F.2d
at 11; Eash, 757 F.2d at 561.
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B. The Supreme Court'sInherent Power Precedents
The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to consider the nature and scope of the inherent power. The Court's
prior decisions concerning the appropriateness of exercising
inherent power evince a deference to federal rules and statutes
that on their face directly control a court's behavior. Indeed,
before Chambers, the Court had warned that "[blecause inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they
must be exercised with restraint and discretion. ' "3 Accordingly, the pre-Chambers Court consistently sought to strike a
balance between the inherent power and codified provisions.
1.

Codified Authority Controls

Before Chambers, the Supreme Court had refused to permit the use of inherent power when rules or statutes were
directly applicable to a case. In Societ6 Internationalev. Rogers," the Court held that a district court's authority to dismiss a complaint because of noncompliance with a production
order depended entirely upon Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure ("Rule 37"),45 and could not be sustained

through use of the district court's inherent power.46 The court
of appeals in Societ6 Internationale had dismissed the case
relying on a broad interpretation of Rule 41(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 41(b)")47 and the district
' Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764.
44 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
41 When SocietJ Internationalewas decided, Rule 37 provided in pertinent part:

(b) Failure to Comply with Order.
(2) .... If any party . . . refuses to obey ...
an order made under
Rule 24 to produce any document or other thing for inspection . . . , the
court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just, and
among other the following:
(iii) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof.
the action or proceeding or any part thereof ....
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (1958).
41 Societd Internationale,357 U.S. at
206-07.

.

.

,

or dismissing

'4 Rule 41(b) was concerned with involuntary dismissal and read in part: "for
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him." FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (1958).
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court's inherent power, rather than on Rule 37, which applied
directly to the issue at hand.4 8 In reversing that court's approach, the Supreme Court concluded that it was inappropriate
for a court to resort to an obscure method of controlling
litigants' conduct when the same result could be reached
through the application of a rule specifically addressing that
conduct (i.e., Rule 37).49 The Court reasoned that, given the
existence of a Federal Rule explicitly providing a remedy for
noncompliance with a production order, a resort to inherent
power would "only obscure analysis of the problem.""
While Societd Internationaledealt with the Federal Rules,
the Court also determined prior to Chambers that inherent
power similarly could not be applied in a manner that was
inconsistent with a federal statute. In Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,5 the
Court ruled that federal courts do not possess the inherent
power to disregard the limitations of an anti-injunction statute.52 In holding that the district court was without power to
act in a manner inconsistent with the limits of 28 U.S.C. section 2283, the Court looked to the plain meaning of the statute, which did not permit injunctive relief under the circumstances. The majority determined that the statute must be
obeyed even though doing so would result in the continued
interference of a protected federal right." The Court went on
to warn that Congress had set forth explicit exceptions to the
statute and that, where the circumstances of the case did not
fall under one of the recognized exceptions, the district court
could not resort to an inherent power remedy.54 Any such act
would be inconsistent with the express language and plain
meaning of the statute.55
The Court even followed this deferential rule in a preChambers case involving attorneys' fees in the context of a
statutory provision. Following the reasoning in Atlantic Coast

" Societd Internationale,357 U.S. at 206-07.

41 Id. at 207.
' Id.
5 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
'2 Id. at 294-96.
Id. at 294.
5'Id. at 295-96.
See id. at 286-87.
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Line, the Court in F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.56 held that a district court had improperly
permitted the awarding of attorneys' fees under the Miller Act,
a federal statute concerning commercial litigation, even though
applicable state law would have permitted such an award.5"
While recognizing that the American Rule had become increasingly unpopular, the Court warned that district courts should
refrain from awarding attorneys' fees under the guise of their
inherent power except when adhering to a recognized exception
to the American Rule.5"
2. Authority to Act Through Inherent Power Approved
By contrast, the Supreme Court has upheld the primacy of
inherent power when a court is faced with a rule that is only
indirectly applicable and, thus, not controlling of the court's
actions. For example, while recognizing that Rule 41(b) permitted litigants to move to dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute, the Court in Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.59 held that
the Rule did not displace a district court's inherent power to
dismiss on the same grounds." The majority reasoned that a
rule that permitted a litigant to move for dismissal did not by
negative implication prohibit the court from dismissing the
case under its inherent power. 1 The Court emphasized that
such a power, couched in the longstanding authority vested in
courts to promote the orderly and expeditious disposition 62of
cases, could not be abrogated absent a direct intent to do so.
3. A Missed Opportunity to Set a Clear Standard
In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,63 the Court recognized
that the inherent power to sanction and codified sanction provisions could co-exist but failed to establish a clear standard

" 417 U.S. 116 (1974).
57 Id. at 126-27.
61 Id. at 128-31.
'9 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
60 Id. at 630-32.
6' Id. at 630.
62 Id. at 629-32.
447 U.S. 752 (1980).
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governing their interaction. Despite this shortcoming, however,
the Court's opinion does suggest that a district court first
should rely on available codified sanction provisions. In holding
that section 1927 did not allow for an award of attorneys'
fees,' the Roadway Court held that such an award would be
appropriate under Rule 37 if the litigants so requested." The
court also recognized that a district court might also have the
inherent power to assess attorneys' fees sua sponte if it found
that the parties or their counsel had acted in bad faith.6 6
While the Court did not consider whether Rule 37 could be
ignored, its emphasis on that Rule suggests that the proper approach should be as follows: Rule 37 should be applied if a
party moves for sanctions under that Rule; however, if the
party does not so move or if the Rule is found inapplicable,
then a court may resort to its inherent power to sanction if bad
faith is found.6 7
4. The Supervisory Power: Criminal Law Counterpart
In the context of criminal law litigation, the Supreme
Court has been equally fervent in recognizing the inherent
limits associated with the application of a judicially-created
authority. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,6" the
Court considered the extent to which a district court could
exercise its supervisory authority, the criminal law equivalent
of inherent power, to dismiss an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct. The Court held that the district court had
no authority to dismiss the indictment under its supervisory
power in order to circumvent an appellate harmless-error inquiry where the prosecutorial misconduct did not prejudice the
defendants.6 9 In so holding, the Court acknowledged that certain limitations inhere in the nature of the supervisory pow-

" Id. at 755-56. Congress subsequently amended § 1927 to include an award of
attorneys' fees. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988)).
€ Roadway Express, 477 U.S. at 756.
€ Id. at 764-68.
67 Id.
c 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
Id. at 254.
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er.7 ° The majority recognized that in the exercise of its supervisory power, a district court "may, within limits, formulate
procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution
or the Congress,""' but warned that "[elven a sensible and
efficient use of the supervisory power ... is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions."72 The Court
concluded that to allow otherwise "would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations
of the law it is charged with enforcing." 3
C. Summary
These decisions, then, recognized the very limited nature
of inherent judicial power as an equitable remedy. They indicated that the inherent power may not be applied in a manner
that is functionally inconsistent with the operation of the Constitution, statutes or the Federal Rules. Therefore, only two
possibilities existed that allowed for the application of inherent
power sanctions. First, a court could use its inherent power if
there was a complete absence of a codified provision dealing
with the conduct sought to be punished. The Roadway decision
was consistent with such an application of inherent power.
Second, a court could use its inherent power if a rule or statute
did not direct a court to act but merely permitted such action.
This was especially true in cases such as Link where a court's
inherent power to act under such circumstances had been
recognized in the past. The use of inherent power to sanction
in these two types of cases is consistent with its nature as an
equitable remedy available when Congress has remained silent.74

70 Id.

at 254-55.

"' Id. at 254 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)).
Id. (quoting Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985)) (alterations in origi-

72

nal).
"3Id. (quoting United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 (1980)).

"' Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980).
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CHAMBERS V. NASCO

A. Facts and ProceduralHistory
On August 9, 1983, G. Russell Chambers, the sole shareholder and only director of Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc.
("CTR"), entered into a purchase agreement ("Agreement")
providing for the sale of the facilities and broadcast license of
KPLC-TV in Lake Charles, Louisiana to NASCO, Inc. for a
purchase price of eighteen million dollars.75 Shortly afterwards, during conversations with NASCO officials, Chambers
professed his reluctance to proceed with the Agreement and
even offered to buy out of it.76 NASCO, however, stated that it
was not interested in terminating the Agreement."
On September 23, 1983, CTR's Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") counsel informed his counterpart at
NASCO that CTR's portion of the FCC application for transfer
of the broadcasting license would not be filed by the requisite
date.7" Frustrated that Chambers had breached his part of
the Agreement, NASCO's counsel notified CTR on Friday,
October 14, 1983, that it would file suit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana the following Monday. NASCO informed CTR that, in order to preserve
the status quo, it would seek specific performance of the contract as well as a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to en" NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372, 1373
(W.D. La. 1985). This Agreement had never been recorded in Calcasieu or Jefferson Davis Parishes where the properties are located. At the time of the signing,
and until September 23, 1983, no officials or employees of the television station
except for Chambers and his attorneys were aware that the Agreement had been
executed. Id. at 1374.
"' Id. at 1374. On August 29, 1983, Chambers called Bill Cook, chairman of
NASCO, and "tried to talk him out of going through with the Agreement, offered
to reimburse all of N[ASCOI's expenses and pay some additional money." Id.
" Id. Upon hearing Chambers' suggestion to buy out the deal, Bill Cook,
NASCO's chairman, informed Chambers that his only interest was in acquiring
KPLC-TV.
" Id. at 1375. Paragraph 6 of the Agreement provided in pertinent part that
"consummation of this Agreement shall be in all respects subject to the approval
of the Commission" and that "[ulpon execution of the Agreement, Buyer and Seller
shall proceed as expeditiously as practicable to file all requisite applications" and
"[iln no event shall the Application be filed later than forty five (45) days from the
date of the Agreement." Id. at 1373-74 (court's emphasis). Accordingly, the joint
application for transfer was to be filed no later than September 23, 1983. Id.
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join the alienation or encumbering of the relevant properties
until a judicial resolution could be obtained.7"
Upon notification by CTR, Chambers and his attorneys
formulated an elaborate scheme to defraud both the court and
NASCO in an effort to deprive NASCO of its ability to seek
specific performance of the Agreement.' Taking advantage of
the two-day lapse between Friday's notice and Monday's scheduled court proceedings, Chambers' attorneys executed a trust.
Mable Baker, Chambers' sister, was appointed as its trustee
and Chambers' three adult children were designated as beneficiaries."' Chambers then directed the President of CTR to execute warranty deeds conveying the two tracts of land that were
to be sold to NASCO under the Agreement to the trust for $1.4
million, the entire amount represented by an unexecuted
note.
On Monday, October 17, NASCO's counsel appeared before
the district court as planned. Although not present at the proceedings, A.J. Gray III, Chambers' Lake Charles counsel, fully
participated in a telephone conference with the court during
which he agreed to the terms of the TRO under the court's
consideration.83 On the following day, Gray admitted to the
court that he had intentionally withheld information about the
transfer of ownership, which had taken place over the weekend." The district court reacted by issuing a preliminary injunction against CTR and Chambers, and by contemporaneously entering a second TRO preventing the trustee from conveying the property in any way.85 The court also warned Gray

79 Id. at 1375-76. This notice was given to Chambers at CTR under the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) and local Rule 11 (now Rule

10).

so Id. at 1376.
81 Id.
82 Id.

Id. at 1377. Mr. Gray was fully aware that the TRO was signed at or
around 1:34 p.m. on October 17, 1983, and made no mention of the scheme that
he and Chambers were simultaneously perpetrating.
Id. Gray admitted by letter that he had recorded the deeds the morning
before and intentionally concealed this fact from the court prior to and during the
TRO proceedings.
" Id. Gray denied representing Baker, who could not be reached. Nevertheless,
the court granted the TRO against Baker in the interests of justice. Two days
before, however, Baker, under the direction of Chambers and his attorneys, had
leased the properties to CTR. There was no evidence that Baker knew what she
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that his acts and those of his client were unethical and would
not be tolerated in the future."
Chambers' pre-trial and post-trial efforts to avoid performance of his contractual obligations were not limited to proffering meritless defenses to NASCO's claims. For example,
Chambers was held in civil contempt for failing to permit inspection of CTR's corporate records, a requirement imposed by
the preliminary injunction."7 Through his attorneys, Chambers also made numerous spurious motions and resorted to
other delay tactics, such as two motions for summary judgment
filed on behalf of Chambers (CTR), a motion for summary
judgment filed by Richard Curry, the trust's attorney, on behalf of the trustee, followed by a Motion to Strike and a supplemental motion and a motion to reconsider (alleging no new
grounds).8"
After the April 1985 trial, but before the district court
entered its judgment on November 27, Chambers and his attorneys continued to frustrate NASCO's attempts to seek specific performance of the Agreement. 9 First, Chambers attempted to alter materially the status quo by petitioning the
FCC for permission to construct a new transmission tower for
the station and to relocate the station's transmission facilities
to a site not covered by the Agreement." Second, both

was signing or that she took place in any of the negotiations. Id.
" NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 127 (W.D.
La. 1989). The court "[flelt that Gray would abide by that warning." Id.
' NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. La.
1984). In this separate ruling, the district court held that the defendant's refusal
to allow NASCO access (as required by the court's October 24, 1983, order) to all
books, records, accounts, etc. that related to the assets purchased, violated both
the letter and spirit of the preliminary injunction and ordered the defendant to
reimburse the plaintiff for all damages, costs and attorneys' fees occasioned by the
contempt proceedings. Id. at 121.
"' Additionally, Gray filed a motion for a protective order and clarification on
behalf of Chambers (CTR) as well as baseless charges and counterclaims against
NASCO alleging, among other things, fraud, harassment and spreading of misinformation. Chambers also charged NASCO with numerous unnamed breaches of the
Agreement, injected pointless new issues including NASCO's ability to pay the
purchase price, noticed the unnecessary depositions of the entire NASCO board of
directors as well as officials of the bank that was to finance the purchase price.
Finally, on January 28, 1985, Gray filed a motion seeking to recuse the trial judge
for bias and prejudice. See generally NASCO, 124 F.R.D. at 127-28.
83 Id. at 128-29.
at 129.
" Id.
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Chambers' and Baker's attorneys moved the court to stay its
judgment pending appeals. After the district court refused,
both parties petitioned the Fifth Circuit. Those petitions were
also denied." Finally, Chambers attempted to foment opposition to the pending FCC application for approval of the transfer of the station's operating license by
having two CTR officers
92
file formal oppositions with the FCC.
Chambers' unethical conduct culminated in his unilateral
and clandestine removal of transmission equipment covered by
the Agreement. Then, at a July 16, 1986, hearing concerning
the equipment's removal, Edwin McCabe, Chambers new counsel, introduced into evidence seventeen fraudulent leases in an
attempt to prove that CTR did not actually own the equipment.93 The court ultimately found the leases to be invalid.94
Nevertheless, Chambers' conduct went on undaunted by the
court's warnings."
B.

The District Court Opinions

The district court held that NASCO was entitled to specific
performance under the Agreement and that the conveyances to
the trust were void.' Chambers and CTR were ordered to file
91

Id.

92 Id.

These bad-faith efforts continued even after Gray, who resigned as counsel for Chambers and CTR on April 2, 1986, was replaced by Chambers' Massachusetts attorney, Edwin McCabe. McCabe attempted to subpoena confidential
financial information pertaining to discussions between certain financial institutions
involved in the financing of the Agreement. After the court sustained NASCO's
motion to quash the subpoena, McCabe continued a veritable onslaught of pre- and
post-hearing motions, all of which were denied by the court. Id. at 129-30.
9 Id. at 130.
9' Id. The court ultimately found the leases to be "nothing more than instruments of deception."
"9Id. at 130. Chambers' veritable onslaught of sanctionable conduct continued
in full force. For example, on August 5, 1986, McCabe caused to be filed two separate appeals and a motion to vacate judgment, and moved the Fifth Circuit to
upset and continue the oral argument on the pending appeals, then scheduled for
August 6, 1986.
" NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 1372, 1382
(W.D. La. 1985). In so holding, the court indicated that paragraph 16(a) of the
Agreement contained a clause authorizing NASCO to seek specific performance of
the contract should CTR default. Similarly, Louisiana Civil Code § 1986 provides
in pertinent part that "fulpon an obligor's failure to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not to do an act, or to execute an instrument, the court shall grant
specific performance plus damages for delay if the obligee so demands." Id. at 1382
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their part of the FCC application within ten days of the entry
of judgment as well as to return the properties in question to
their status before the transfer to Baker.97
The district court made several findings regarding
Chambers' role in the attempt to evade specific performance of
the Agreement. The court found that Chambers alone had determined that the properties should be transferred to the trust
and that he alone had supplied the consideration to be used by
the trustee to repay the note, which consisted of rental payments by CTR to Baker.9" In a larger sense, the court found
that Chambers was the mastermind as well as the controlling
actor behind the whole scheme to perpetrate this fraud against
the court and NASCO.9 9
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court and remanded so that sanctions for a frivolous appeal
might be fixed, and for a determination as to whether further
sanctions were appropriate.' 9 On remand, the district court
found that, despite repeated warnings to both Chambers and
his counsel about their blatantly unethical conduct, such conduct had continued in full force.'' As a result, NASCO had
incurred legal fees and expenses totaling $996,644.65."2 In
considering on what basis to sanction Chambers, the district
court determined that Rule 11 and section 1927 were insuffi(court's emphasis); see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1986 (West 1987).
' NASCO, 623 F. Supp. at 1386.
Id. at 1378.
Id. The court found that the attorneys, CTR officials and the trustee all had
acted under Chambers' direction. The court interpreted Baker's lack of knowledge
about the transactions she had been a party to as just one indication of the high
degree of control that Chambers exercised over the actors in this case. Baker said
she "signed simply because her brother would not have directed her to do so if he
was not going to arrange a means of payment." Id. at 1379.
C' See NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 797 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.
1986); see also NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120,
122 (W.D. La. 1989). The decision to impose appellate sanctions was made under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, which allows for the award of attorneys'
fees and double costs.
...NASCO, 124 F.R.D. at 130-31. In commenting on the conduct of both Chambers and Gray, the court noted that "the record itself establishes that both are
capable of any fraud that is necessary for a given purpose, and that neither is
worthy of belief." Id. at 131.
Id. at 143. This sum, however, did not include sanctions already awarded by
"Q2
the court in the contempt proceedings, nor did it include sanctions awarded by the
Fifth Circuit. Therefore, in addition to this large sum, Chambers had to pay
$70,977.02 in additional sanctions. Id.
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cient.'0 ' It ruled that, although several important instances of
sanctionable conduct involved knowingly filing false pleadings,
Rule 11 sanctions could not be applied to Chambers' out-ofcourt conduct. °4 Similarly, the court found section 1927 to be
insufficient because it could be applied only against Chambers'
attorneys and not against Chambers directly. The court indicated that these sanctioning mechanisms were deficient because they could not be applied to out-of-court acts of oppression, delay and harassment that, according to the court, were
designed to "reduce plaintiff to exhausted compliance."'' 5
Having found the application of codified sanction provisions
inadequate, the district court chose to rely exclusively on its
inherent power in sanctioning Chambers nearly one million
dollars for bad-faith conduct stemming from his breach of the
Agreement." 6
The Fifth CircuitDecision

C.

In affirming the district court's judgment, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that district courts sitting in diversity have inherent
power to award attorneys' fees as a sanction for bad-faith conduct even absent a state statute authorizing such awards." 7

103

Id.

at 139. According to the court, Rule 11 "tests the attorney's conduct only

at the time the paper is signed" and, because "the problems of this case have
little to do with the certification involved in the signing of a 'pleading, motion, or
other paper,'" Rule 11 was insufficient. Id. (citation omitted).
' Id. at 138-39. The district court made an argument regarding the applicability of Rule 11 that appears to be inappropriate. The opinion suggested that
Rule 11 sanctions were inappropriate where the sanctionable conduct was not
discovered until after the merits of the case were decided. However, Rule 11 sanctions can be applied even after the decision on the merits. See Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990) ("It is well established that a federal
court may consider collateral issues [even] after an action is no longer pending.").
A court may consider an award even years after the entry of a judgment. Id.
101 NASCO, 124 F.R.D. at 138.
1
Id. at 143. This total did not represent the total amount of attorneys' fees,
costs and other expenses incurred by NASCO, but it did include $53,459.68 in
attorneys' fees and expenses paid in connection with the sanction proceedings. Id.
at 143, 146.
The court also suspended A.J. Gray from practicing in the Western District of
Louisiana for three years, Richard Curry for six months and Edwin McCabe for a
period of five years. Id. at 144-46.
10 NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 698 (5th Cir.
1990).
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Although Louisiana law allows for awarding attorneys' fees
only when a contract or statute specifically provides for them,
and although Louisiana Law fails to recognize an exception for
bad-faith breaches of contract, the court concluded that
attorneys' fees could be imposed as a sanction under the bad
faith exception to the American Rule." 8 While admitting that
inherent power is "not a tidy doctrinal package," 0 9 the Fifth
Circuit emphasized that it is a power "necessary to the exercise of all others""--one "governed not by rule or statute but
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own
affairs."1n
D.

The Supreme Court Decision

The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit and upheld
a district court's authority to sanction litigants under the guise
of its inherent power."' The Court found that district courts
indeed possess the inherent authority to sanction litigants for
their bad-faith conduct."' Moreover, the Court held that a
court's inherent power to sanction for such bad-faith abuses is
not displaced by applicable codified sanction provisions." 4

'O Id. at 701.
...Id. at 703.

n.Id. at 702 (emphasis omitted) (citing Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (in turn citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
32, 34 (1812))).
. Id. at 702 (emphasis omitted) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626,
630 (1962)). The court sought to dispel the argument that sanctioning mechanisms
such as Rule 11 and § 1927 preempted a court's authority to resort to its inherent
power to sanction. Rather, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that in the absence of
express language indicating the displacement of inherent power to sanction, the
relevant rules and statutes should be viewed as supplementing the presently operative inherent power to sanction for bad-faith practices. See id. at 702-03.
1 Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991).
1 Id. at 2133. The court stated that:
The imposition of sanctions in this instance [when acts are done in bad
faith] transcends a court's equitable power concerning relations between
the parties and reaches a court's inherent power to police itself, thus
serving the dual purpose of "vindicatfing] judicial authority without resort
to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and
mak[ing] the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his
opponent's obstinacy."
Id. (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978)).
114 Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134. In support of its holding, the Court stated
that "[tihese other mechanisms (statutes and rules), taken alone or together, are
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The Majority Opinion

Writing for the Court, Justice White concluded that federal
courts possess the inherent power to sanction litigants for badfaith conduct despite the American Rule, which generally prohibits fee-shifting. 115 First, the Court summarized the nature
and scope of the inherent power,"6 finding that it comported
with the bad faith exception to the American Rule, which allows a court to assess attorneys' fees when a party has "acted
in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."117
The majority then concluded that a federal court could
invoke its inherent power to sanction to the exclusion of Rule
11 and section 1927, even though such codified sanction
provisions applied to the abuses uncovered during the litigation process."' The Court did not consider these sanctioning
mechanisms to be substitutes for a court's inherent power to
sanction. Rather, it viewed them as congruous components of a
court's overall power to control abusive practices." 9
Justice White next dismissed Chambers' claim that, even
when a party has acted in bad faith a federal court sitting in
diversity should not allow a party to recover punitive damages
if state law would prohibit such an award, as does the law of
Louisiana. 20 The majority concluded that substantive state

not substitutes for the inherent power, for that power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions." Id.
1 Id.
116 Id. at 2132-33. The Court admitted, however, that there are limits to inher-

ent powers and stated that, "because of their very potency[,] . . . [they] must be
exercised with restraint and discretion." Id. at 2132; see supra notes 11-29 and
accompanying text.
17 Id. at 2133 (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S.
240, 258-59 (1975)). The Court claimed that "the imposition of sanctions in this
instance transcends a court's equitable power concerning relations between the
parties and reaches a court's inherent power to police itself." Id.
118 Id.
at 2134-35.
...See id. In support of this proposition the Court first indicated that, "whereas
each of the other mechanisms reaches only certain individuals or conduct, the
inherent power extends to a full range of litigation abuses." Id. Additionally, the
Court noted that whereas the inherent power to sanction is limited to the "bad
faith" exception to the American Rule, sanctioning mechanisms such as Rule 11
often impose less stringent objective standards of reasonable inquiry. Id.
120 Id. at 2138. Under Louisiana Law, punitive damages for a breach of contract
cannot be awarded, even when a party has acted in bad faith. Id. at 2137-38. In

1993]

RULE 11 LOST

1247

policy was not implicated because the award of attorneys' fees
served the purpose of vindicating "the District Court's authority over a recalcitrant litigant."12 ' Moreover, according to the
Court, the twin aims of the Erie Rule were not implicated as
neither forum-shopping nor the inequitable administration of
laws would be encouraged; the sanctions were assessed for
"disobedience of the court's orders and the attempt to defraud
and could be levied on either a winning or
the court itself'
22
losing party.1
Finally, the Court concluded that the district court had
acted within its discretion in assessing the entire amount of
NASCO's attorneys' fees as a sanction for Chambers' bad-faith
conduct.'23 The justices agreed with the district court's conclusion that the assessment of all of NASCO's attorneys' fees
was called for given the frequent and severe nature of
Chambers' abuse of the judicial process.
2.

Dissenting Opinions

In a vigorous dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter, accepted that the
defendant's conduct warranted sanctioning, but argued that

this case, sanctions were imposed on Chambers "for the fraud he perpetrated on
the court and the bad faith he displayed toward both his adversary -and the court
throughout the course of the litigation." Id. at 2138. Therefore, according to the
majority, there was no need to address Louisiana contract law. See supra note 96
and accompanying text.
121 Id. at 2137 (quoting Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691 (1978)). The Court
noted that although the award of attorneys' fees has a compensatory effect, it
nevertheless serves the same purpose as a fine imposed for civil contempt, in that
the award is punitive. Id.
1" Id. at 2137. The Court claimed that forum shopping is not a concern when
sanctions are imposed under the bad faith exception because the imposition depends not on which party wins, but on how the parties "conduct themselves during the litigation." Id. Additionally, because the imposition depends on the way in
which the parties conduct themselves during litigation, it would not be inequitable
to apply the exception to non-citizens. Id.
" Id. at 2138. Chambers argued that there were five criteria for imposing
attorneys' fees as a sanction under the court's inherent power and that the district
court failed to act properly with respect to all five. The Court addressed each one
of the claims and found that the district court had not abused its discretion in
any way. Id. at 2138-40.
124 Id. at 2139. According to the Court, it was within its discretion to "vindicate
itself and compensate NASCO by ordering the payment of all of NASCO's
attorneys' fees." Id.
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the Court's decision effected "a vast expansion of the power of
federal courts, unauthorized by rule or statute."" In asserting that inherent powers are the exception rather than the
rule, the dissent maintained that a federal court is not free to
ignore applicable federal rules and statutes under the guise of
its inherent powers when imposing sanctions on a litigant. 2 '
Justice Kennedy argued that "the American Rule recognizes
that the legislature, not the judiciary, possesses constitutional
responsibility for defining sanctions and fees, " 27 and that
"the bad faith exception to the Rule allows courts to assess fees
not provided for by Congress 'in narrowly defined circumstances." 8 Justice Kennedy indicated that Congress had provided
district courts with a "comprehensive arsenal of Federal Rules
and statutes," some of which mandate sanctions and may be
utilized in punishing abusive litigation tactics.'2 9 Having
12 Id. at 2141 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy's dissent conceded
that Chambers' conduct warranted "severe corrective measures," but he claimed
that the Court's "outrage at Chambers' conduct should not obscure the boundaries
of settled legal categories." Id.
12 Id. at 2143. Justice Kennedy's dissent argued that the majority misread its
precedents and failed to recognize that rules and statutes place limitations on the
Court's exercise of inherent power. Id.
127 Id.

at 2142.

Id. at 2142-43 (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765
(1980)). Justice Kennedy argued that because "[inherent powers are the exception,
not the rule, . . . their assertion requires special justification in each case." Id. at
2143.
2 Id. at 2142. The dissent listed a veritable plethora of statutes and rules
which the district court may have relied upon to sanction Chambers and his attorneys, including- 18 U.S.C. § 401 to impose fines or imprisonment for contempt of
its authority; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to, award costs, expenses and attorneys' fees
against Chambers' attorneys for vexatiously multiplying proceedings; Rule 11 to
sanction Chambers or his attorneys for filing groundless pleadings, motions, or
other papers; Rule 16(f) to sanction Chambers or his attorneys for failing to comply with a pretrial order; Rule 26(g) to sanction Chambers or his attorneys for
making baseless discovery requests or objections; Rule 30(g) to award expenses
caused by the failure to attend a deposition or to serve a subpoena on a party to
be deposed; Rules 37(d) & (g) to award expenses when a party fails to respond to
discovery requests or fails to participate in the forming of a discovery plan; Rule
41(b) to dismiss an action or claim of a party that fails to prosecute, to comply
with the Federal Rules, or to obey a court order; Rule 45(f) to punish any person
who fails to obey a subpoena; Rule 56(g) to award expenses and/or contempt damages when a party presents an affidavit in a summary judgment motion in bad
faith or for the purpose of delay; Rule 81 to make rules governing local practice
that are not inconsistent with the Federal Rules; 28 U.S.C. § 1912 to award just
damages and costs on affirmance; and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 to
award damages and costs for a frivolous appeal. Id.
1
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found that Congress had provided an adequate means through
which to impose sanctions in the present case, the dissent
concluded that the district court was not entitled to invoke its
inherent power because it was not necessary under the circumstances. 3 ' Justice Kennedy was careful to note, however,
that limitations on a court's inherent power did not mean its
abrogation. Rather, a court can act to preserve its authority
through its inherent power in the absence of an applicable
statute or rule.''
Finally, the dissent reasoned that the district court had
overstepped its authority in penalizing Chambers for his prelitigation breach of contract.'32 Justice Kennedy found that
the district court's opinion indicated that Chambers was partially sanctioned for his initial breach of contract. 3 According to the dissent, such an imposition of fines, not permitted by
Louisiana substantive law,3 constituted a violation of a ba-

Although the dissent did not expressly indicate that the conduct of Chambers
and his attorneys fell within each of the above rules, it asserted that the
majority's argument that inherent power can be used when an applicable rule or
statute exists to punish the conduct is groundless in light of the broad range of
provisions provided by Congress. Id.
13 Id. at 2143. The dissent noted that "necessity" placed an important limitation on a court's use of its inherent powers. Id. Specifically, Justice Kennedy asserted that "like all applications of inherent power, the authority to sanction badfaith litigation practices can be exercised only when necessary to preserve the
authority of the court." Id.; see also Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764. According
to the dissent, a necessity does not exist if a rule or statute already punishes the
conduct. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. 2143.
131 Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2146. The dissent conceded that cases can arise for
which sanctions are not provided in the rules and, thus, a court may resort to its
inherent power. The dissent argued, however, that "as the number and scope of
rules and statutes governing litigation misconduct increases, the necessity to resort
to inherent authority-a predicate to its proper application-lessens." Id.
132 Id. at 2147. The dissent claimed that the majority avoided addressing this
issue by claiming that the district court was not punishing Chambers for breach of
contract. Id.
13 Id. at 2147-48. The dissent argued that the district court plainly stated that
sanctions were being imposed for Chambers' breach of contract. For example, the
District Court wrote: "Chambers arbitrarily and without legal cause refused to
perform, forcing NASCO to bring its suit for specific performance." Id. at 2147
(citing NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 143 (W.D.
La. 1989)).
134 Id. at 2149 (citing International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d
1039, 1041 (La. 1988)). Louisiana law prohibits assessing punitive damages for
breach of contract unless expressly agreed to in the contract or required by statute. Louisiana also does not recognize a bad faith exception for breach of contract.
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sic tenet of the Erie Doctrine that, "[elxcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any [diversity] case is the law of the
State.' 3 5
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia agreed with the
majority's conclusion that federal courts have the inherent
power to impose penalties upon litigants for bad-faith conduct. 6 He asserted that where the Federal Rules and statutes leave a district court with no remedy or an inadequate
one for sanction-worthy conduct, a court could resort to "an
overall sanction resting at least in substantial portion upon the
court's inherent power [which] need not be broken down into
its component parts, with the actions sustainable under the
Rules separately computed."'37 Yet Justice Scalia found it
necessary to dissent separately for what he considered to be
the Court's unjustified extension of the scope of a court's inherent power to include the sanctioning of Chambers' initial
breach of contract. 3 8
III. ANALYSIS
The Chambers Court was correct in concluding that
Chambers' conduct warranted the imposition of sanctions. One
would be hard pressed to find an acceptable explanation for
the reprehensible manner in which Chambers and his attorneys conducted themselves. It is not the result reached by the
Chambers Court that is troubling, but the means used to
achieve it. Accordingly, the Court's approach to sanctions may
best be viewed as an effort to counteract Chambers' extreme

Id. at 2148 (quoting Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). The dissent stated that "[tihe inherent power exercised here violates the fundamental
tenet of federalism announced in Erie by regulating primary behavior that the
Constitution leaves to the exclusive province of States." Id.
"I Id. at 2140 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, however, noted that all
sanctions imposed under the court's inherent powers do not require a showing of
bad faith.
at 2141.
13 Id.
Id. Justice Scalia "emphatically agreed" with Justice Kennedy's dissent that
135

"the District Court here had no power to impose any sanctions for petitioner's flagrant, bad-faith breach of contract." Id. He also agreed that "it appeared" that the
district court had in fact imposed sanctions for Chambers' breach of contract under
its inherent authority. Id.
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conduct by adopting an extremist approach of its own.
In holding that district courts were not obligated to apply
codified sanction provisions when confronted with abusive
conduct, the Court disregarded not only its own precedents
recognizing the limited nature of a court's inherent powers, but
also longstanding rules of statutory interpretation, which, at a
minimum, would have required the application of Rule 11
sanctions. Moreover, the majority largely ignored Chambers'
contention that he was sanctioned in part for his initial breach
of contract. This is particularly disturbing given that Louisiana
substantive law permitted him to behave in such a manner
without the fear of being sanctioned.
A.

The Inherent Power and Rules of Statutory Interpretation

The majority's effort to reconcile the district court's reliance on its inherent power to sanction rather than directly applicable codified provisions disregards the limited nature of
this equitable remedy. The Chambers Court ignored rules of
statutory interpretation which would have required the application of codified provisions to specific instances of sanctionworthy conduct. The mere fact that the authority to act under
such equitable powers has been recognized as distinct from
statutory powers does not justify such an approach. As a result, the Court's ruling endows courts with the equitable authority to disregard sound principles of statutory interpretation.
In the central part of the Court's analysis, the majority
turned its efforts towards negating Chambers' contention that
codified sanction provisions such as Rule 11 and section 1927
displaced a court's ability to sanction under the guise of its
inherent powers.' 39 To reach this result, Justice White looked
directly to these provisions."' Finding that nothing in the
language of Rule 11 or section 1927 expressly prohibited a
court from sanctioning under its inherent powers, the majority
concluded that this power was not displaced by such codified
provisions.4 The Court then concluded that to require a

Id. at 2134.

1 3

SId.; see supra notes 1 & 2.
141

Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134. According to the Court, provisions such as
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court to use applicable codified sanction provisions before invoking its inherent power to address those instances of
sanctionable conduct outside the scope of the codified provisions would produce satellite litigation, something contrary to
the purpose of the Federal Rules.' However, the Court was
disingenuous in that it failed to acknowledge that satellite
litigation can result from the exclusive application of a codified
sanction, an inherent power sanction or from a combined use of
inherent power and codified sanctions.' Moreover, the Court
failed to apply longstanding rules of statutory interpretation
that would have required imposing Rule 11 sanctions under
the circumstances.' To counter this argument, the majority
determined, much as the district court did, that rules and
statutes were not "up to the task" in the present case to sanc-

Rule 11 and § 1927 reach certain individuals or conduct, whereas inherent power
covers a "full range of litigation abuses," which allows a court to "police itself."
Thus, the codified provisions are not substitutes for inherent power. Id. at 213334.

142 Id. at 2136. Rule 11 imposes five obligations on a certifying attorney. The
signature on any paper represents that an attorney or party
[1] has read the [document]; [2] to the best of the signor's knowledge,
information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry; [31 it is well
grounded in fact; [41 it is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and
[5] it is not interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.

GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTATIVE MEASURES § 1.04[b] (2d ed. 1993).

Critics feared that the Advisory Committee's invitation to use Rule 11 to
attack pleadings and motions would trigger an avalanche of satellite litigation. As
part of their routine litigation strategy, parties could use motions under the Rule
to challenge all five obligations. This could generate litigation over the sufficiency
of factual or legal support available to an attorney at the time the papers were
signed rather than on the actual merits of the case. Id. § 1.071b]. Rule 11 is also
susceptible to use as an abusive discovery device as litigants seek to discover the
factual basis for their opponents' claims in order to make a Rule 11 motion. Moreover, a mini-satellite trial on the Rule 11 issues could lead to a decision of the
case on the merits at a premature and inappropriate time. Id.
1' See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990). In Cooter & Gell,
the Supreme Court held that, although a voluntary dismissal pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) did not deprive a district court of jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions after dismissal. The Court explained that "although the
Rule must be read in light of concerns that it will spawn satellite litigation and
chill vigorous advocacy, any interpretation must give effect to the Rule's central
goal of deterrence." Id. at 393.
14 See infra notes 150-71 and accompanying text.
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tion adequately the bad-faith conduct.'45 However, consideration of the district court's findings of fact as well as the sanction-worthy conduct it identified reveals that codified sanction
provisions should have been applied in the present case. " 6
Codified sanction mechanisms punish conduct under certain well-defined circumstances. As a result, a broad body of
law that explains the scope of and imposes limitations on these
provisions has developed.'47 The majority, however, attempted to read into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure an intent
to permit the inherent power to reign supreme over those rules
that contain sanction provisions.
Yet, carrying this argument to its logical extreme results in an absurd conclusion;
rules that do not contain provisions explicitly displacing the
inherent power are subordinate to the inherent power. Moreover, implementation of those rules is subject to the discretion
of the court, even though they appear mandatory on their face.
Such reasoning warrants much criticism. Federal courts should
not be free to disregard the plain meaning of directly controlling authority in an effort to simplify the task of punishing
recalcitrant litigants. "9
1. Codified Legislative Mandates
Rules of statutory interpretation are equally applicable to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 The starting point in
any case involving the interpretation of a rule is the text of the
1..

Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136.

...See infra discussion at Part III.A.2.
.. A multitude of rules and statutes contain sanction provisions that seek to
punish certain objectionable conduct. For a list of these provisions, see supra note
129. Similarly, Justice Kennedy's dissent in Chambers indicates that the district
court possessed sufficient leeway under the rules and statute to award NASCO
compensation for expenses resulting from Chambers' meritless efforts to prolong
the litigation. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2142; see supra note 129 (listing various
provisions the court could have relied upon to sanction Chambers). In one fell
swoop the Supreme Court has effectively concluded that these provisions as well
as the body of law that has developed around them no longer need be considered
when it would be easier to apply exclusively an inherent power sanction.
14. Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2134.
149 See supra Part II (discussing Supreme Court precedents recognizing the
limited nature of a court's inherent powers).
1.. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989)
(the same standards used to interpret a statute are utilized to interpret the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
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rule itself.'5 Only where a rule or a statute is ambiguous
and capable of more than one interpretation should the court
look beyond the text and consider the promulgating body's
intent.'5 2 But where the language of a rule or statute is clear
and unambiguous, a court need not look to external sources of
interpretation such as the Advisory Committee's Notes." 3 To
permit a court to reconstruct a rule that, on its face, is unambiguous by resort to Advisory Committee Notes in effect endows it with a legislative authority to rewrite the rule. The
provision's unambiguous language should not be expanded or
contracted by broad statements made during the course of the
enactment process. 5 4 Thus, the sole function of the court
should be to enforce the provision according to its terms when
the terms are clear and unambiguous.'5 5
When faced with sanction-worthy conduct, a district court
first should adhere to the provisions of an applicable codified
.. See Cayuga Indian Nation of New York v. Cuomo, 565 F. Supp. 1297, 1313
(N.D.N.Y. 1983); United States v. Hepp, 497 F. Supp. 348, 349 (N.D. Iowa 1980),
affd, 656 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1981).
12 In re Arizona Appetito's Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing
NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957)). Courts interpret a federal statute by determining Congressional intent. To do this a court first looks to the language of the statute. If, however, the statutory language gives rise to several
different interpretations, then a court must adopt the interpretation that "can most
fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress manifested." Id.
at 219 (citations omitted).
...Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
533, 540-41 (1991) (stating that "[a]s with a statute, the inquiry is complete if a
court finds the text of the Rule to be clear and unambiguous"); Consumer Product
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); see West Virginia
Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 111 S. Ct. 1138, 1146-47 (1991) (noting that the since
the statutory language clearly demonstrates that Congress chose to enact more
restrictive language than in other statutes, the courts are bound by the restriction); Miller v. Carlson, 768 F. Supp. 1331, 1335 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
14 A court, however, may deviate from the plain meaning of a rule or statute
where a literal application would produce a result 'demonstrably at odds with the
intention of its drafters." United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
242 (1989). In such cases a clear expression of legislative intent controls judicial
application of the rule's provisions. Id. However, the Chambers Court did not contend that applying the plain meaning of either provision would provide a result at
odds with their respective purposes.
.. Cf. US v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1991). In Koyomejian
the language of the statute was not clear and unambiguous. Accordingly, the court
explained that "[wihen Congress has not directly addressed and answered a question, courts . . . in answering, by necessity, should be guided by the aims, principles and policies that manifestly underlie enacted statutes." Id.
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sanction provision, such as those found in Rule 11. It should
not act in a manner that is inconsistent with that Rule, especially when applying inherent power sanctions. Thus, after a
district court has determined that a Rule 11 violation exists, it
"may not ignore the command of the [rule]: 'sanctions shall be
imposed."" 6 Nonetheless, the court retains wide discretion in
determining the extent and form of the sanctions to be assessed.'57

Throughout the course of the proceedings to determine the
imposition of sanctions in Chambers, the district court, the
Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court all maintained that
Chambers' conduct with respect to pleadings, motions and
other papers was clearly sanctionable under Rule 11.' Having made such a determination, these courts were obligated to
impose or to mandate the imposition of sanctions under Rule
11. Only when the 'court's codified authority to sanction had
been expended should it have resorted to its equitable authority. But the district court in Chambers imposed inherent power
sanctions despite its acknowledgment that aspects of the
litigant's conduct fell within the purview of Rule 11.1
Moreover, Rule 11 sanctions could have been imposed
directly on Chambers as well as his counsel. Courts and commentators alike have recognized that a plain reading of the
Rule supports the conclusion that a non-signing represented
party also may be sanctioned.'6 0 The Rule provides that upon
...O'Malley v. New York City Transit Auth., 896 F.2d 704, 709 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987)); see also Invst Fin. Group, Inc. v. ChemNuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 401 (6th Cir. 1987); NCNB Nat'l Bank of N.C. v.
Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 941 (4th Cir. 1987).
117 Saunders v. Lucy Webb Haynes-Nat'l Training Sch., 124 F.R.D. 3, 7
(D.D.C.
1989) (citing Westmoreland v. C.B.S., Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir.
1985)); Invst Fin. Group, 815 F.2d at 401; see Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 401-05 (1990).
...Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2136, 2140 (1991) (stating that all of
Chambers's conduct was "deemed santionable" because of "relentless, repeated,
fraudulent and brazenly unethical efforts"). Moreover, as the dissent indicated,
there were a multitude of other applicable sanction provisions. Id. at 2142; see
supra note 129 (listing other provisions that may have applied under the circumstances).
...Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136, 2140.
"" See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee's Notes to 1983 amendments);
Danvers v. Danvers, 959 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1992); O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 710
(citing Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986)); Browning Deben-
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the finding of a Rule 11 violation, "the court... shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction."16 1 Although the appropriateness of
sanctioning a non-signing represented party would depend on
the party's conduct,16 2 given the central role Chambers
played in attempting to perpetrate a fraud on the court and his
evident knowledge of the law,'63 the district court could have
sanctioned Chambers directly under Rule 11.' 4
To read into Rule 11 an intent to preempt its application
under circumstances where it is most applicable would be
contrary to its true purpose. In effect, the majority has attempted to infer an intent on the part of the Rule's drafters
regarding the role that Rule 11 is to play when a district court
ture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078, 1088-89 (2d Cir. 1977); see
11.02 (2d ed. 1985).
also JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
161 FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
Id. (Advisory Committee's Notes to 1983 amendments):
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may
be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction
on the client . . . . This modification [of the previous version of Rule 11]
brings Rule 11 in line with practice under Rule 37, which allows sanctions for abuses during discovery to be imposed upon the party, the attorney, or both.
Id. (citations omitted).
In most cases, a court will find it inappropriate to sanction the client alone.
However, where the client misleads his attorney as to the facts or the purpose
behind a proceeding, courts will tend to sanction only the client. See, e.g., Danvers,
959 F.2d at 604-05 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing Rule 11 sanctions against a represented party where he had brought the
action for the purpose of harassment); O'Malley, 896 F.2d at 710 (finding the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions on a represented party appropriate where the party
was a practicing attorney); Friesing v. Vandergrift, 126 F.R.D. 527, 529 (S.D. Tex.
1989) (requiring that the party must be personally aware of or otherwise responsible for the sanctionable conduct); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Group Sys. Int'l
Far East, Ltd., 109 F.R.D. 594, 600 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (imposing sanctions on a
corporate client where it had knowledge of relevant facts which where determinative of motion to dismiss). But see Slane v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist.,
115 F.R.D. 61, 62-63 (D. Colo. 1987) (refusing to impose sanctions under Rule 11
against parties for failure of counsel to advise them that their claims were without
merit). See generally VAIRO, supra note 142, § 10.5[b].
" See NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 132
(W.D. La. 1989). The Court listed several factors relating to Chambers' conduct
which it found refuted his argument that he was an innocent party, without
knowledge of the law, who had "been led astray by improper advice of his counsel." Id. at 132. For example, Mr. Chambers had frequently assisted in preparing
defenses in lawsuits as well as often testified as an expert witness. In fact, in the
first two months of 1985 he was scheduled to testify in five trials. Id.
164 See generally supra note 162.
"
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decides to apply inherent power sanctions to conduct falling
within the scope of the Rule. Specifically, the Chambers majority relied upon the Advisory Committee's statement that the
Rule builds upon a court's inherent powers to justify the district court's failure to apply Rule 11 in this case.'6 5 Rule 11,
however, was amended in 1983 to facilitate its application
because in its prior form, the Rule had not been an effective
deterrent to abusive litigation practices." Although the Advisory Committee noted that the amended Rule builds upon
and expands the "equitable doctrine permitting the court to
award expenses, including attorney[s'] fees, to a litigant whose
opponent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation," its "new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of
courts to impose [Rule 11] sanctions."1 67 While Rule 11 builds
upon the judiciary's equitable powers, it should not be subordinated to the inherent power given its codified status.
Rule 11 was amended in 1983 to encourage courts to resort to it when imposing sanctions on persons who abused
judicial processes through acts prohibited by the Rule.'68 The
majority's argument that the mandatory nature of Rule '11
extends only to whether a court must impose sanctions and not
to what type of sanctions to impose is counterintuitive given
that a Rule 11 violation mandates application of Rule 11, and
not inherent power sanctions.'6 9 Although a court has substantial discretion to tailor an appropriate sanction,'70 that
15 Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2134-35 (1991).

166FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee's Notes to 1983 amendments).
Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in
deterring abuses. There has been considerable confusion as to (1) the

circumstances that should trigger striking a pleading or motion or taking
disciplinary action, (2) the standard of conduct expected of attorneys who
sign pleadings and motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions. The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of
courts to impose sanctions by emphasizing the responsibilities of the

attorney and reenforcing those obligations imposed by the imposition of
sanctions.
Id. (citations omitted); see also VAIRO, supra note 142, § 1.04[b].
10 FED.,R. Civ. P. 11 (Advisory Committee's Notes to 1983 amendments).
16 See supra notes 140-41.
1. See Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136 (stating that a federal court is not forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct by means of the inherent power simply because
that conduct could also be sanctioned under the rules); see also supra note 2.
17 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990) ("in directing the
district court to impose an 'appropriate' sanction, Rule 11 itself indicates that the
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sanction must be a Rule 11 sanction. In the present case, applying Rule 11 consistently with its plain meaning would have
resulted in the imposition of significant sanctions against
Chambers for his violations of the certification process during
the course of the litigation.
The Advisory Committee's Notes were intended to explain
and facilitate the process of implementing sanctions under the
amended Rule. They were not intended to provide an excuse to
ignore a rule that clearly mandates the imposition of sanctions
under circumstances such as those present in Chambers. Under rules of statutory construction, if the intent of the promulgating authority is clear from the language of the rule itself,
the court must give effect to the rule as written.' Accordingly, Chambers should have been decided by placing a greater
emphasis on Rule 11 where it was applicable.
2.

Chambers' Sanction-Worthy Conduct

The Supreme Court's focus on the inherent power appears
to be a misguided effort to take advantage of the district
court's indiscriminate imposition of inherent power sanctions.
This conclusion is made evident by the majority's failure to
undertake any semblance of an independent analysis into the
appropriateness of imposing sanctions under Rule 11 and section 1927. Rather, the court largely mimicked the explanation
proffered by the district court that codified sanction provisions
were not "up to the task" in this case because much of
Chambers' sanction-worthy conduct could not be covered by
these provisions.' 2 To justify this conclusion, the Court merely claimed that it relied on the lower court's "informed discretion"3 to determine that these provisions were not appropri7
ate.'
A careful consideration of the sanctionable conduct that

district court is empowered to exercise its discretion").
17' Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S.

361, 373 (1986); Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); see Difford v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.,
910 F.2d 1316, 1318 (6th Cir. 1990); see also 7 MOORE ET AL., supra note 160,
69.04.
" Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2131.
113

Id. at 2136.
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took place during the course of the Chambers case, however,
reveals that this meritless litigation was prolonged by the badfaith proliferation of pleadings, motions and other papers. The
district court indicated that Chambers' sanctionable conduct
fell into three general categories: (1) out of court acts undertaken in bad faith; (2) filing false and frivolous pleadings,
motions and other papers; and (3) other delay tactics." 4 In
determining that Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate, the
district court proclaimed that "[t]he problems of this case have
little to do with the certification involved in the signing of a
pleading, motion, or other paper" and that Chambers' out-ofcourt conduct would be the main focus of the sanctions." 5
The Court's conclusions, however, are at best unsatisfactory.
A comparison of Chambers' frivolous motions with his
sanction-worthy, out-of-court conduct reveals that the motions
played a principal role in prolonging the litigation, whereas the
out-of-court conduct was extreme only to the extent that it
displayed his utter disregard for the court's authority. The
district court expended considerable energy not only in considering the multitude of Chambers' motions as they were presented, but also in discussing what caused them to be frivolous."'6 The court determined that his pretrial sanction-worthy conduct included the filing of: two motions for summary
judgment filed on behalf of CTR; a motion for summary judgment followed by a motion to strike and a motion to reconsider
filed on behalf of the trustee; a motion for protective order and
clarification filed on behalf of Chambers; baseless charges and
counterclaims filed on behalf of Chambers; notice of needless
depositions; and numerous requests for continuations and extensions filed by Chambers."' Chambers' counsel also filed
numerous meritless motions and appeals after the trial had
been conducted but before entry of judgment, including: a motion to the court to stay its judgment pending contemplated appeals; a motion in limine; several appeals from the district
court's orders, including one granting relief from the timing
and termination provisions of the Agreement; and a motion to
17
176

See supra notes 80-111 and accompanying text.
NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 138 (W.D.

La. 1989).
"' See id. at 120.
'77 Id. at 127-28.
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By comparison,
vacate a prior judgment on the merits.'
Chambers' out-of-court acts fell largely into two categories:
those involving his initial breach of contract 9 and those concerning matters pending before the court that could have been
punished through the application of codified provisions."s
Clearly, Chambers' sanction-worthy conduct cannot be characterized as unrelated to or unassociated with the filing of papers with the court. Thus, Rule 11 and other codified provisions should have been the proper avenue to pursue in formulating an approach to sanctions.' 8 '
That the Court had some misgivings about affirming the
use of inherent power under the circumstances is evident from
the way the majority's decision wavered from staunchly advocating the district court's use of its inherent power to sanction
to uncomfortably acknowledging its limitations.'82 In discussing the differences between inherent power and codified sanction remedies, Justice White quickly conceded that given the
existence of codified sanction provisions, "[a]t the very least,
the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the interstices."'8 3 This concession to the primacy of the codified sanction provisions strongly suggests that there exists a better way
of approaching this potential conflict of authorities.

178 Id.
179 Id.

at 129-30.
at 126-30. Chambers breached the Agreement when he transferred the

CTR property to the trust and lodged formal complaints with the FCC to frustrate
NASCO's efforts to obtain the necessary licenses.
18 See id. at 127-30. For instance, Chambers refused to allow inspection of corporate records in direct defiance of a standing preliminary injunction; petitioned
the FCC to construct a new transmission tower in violation of the status quo; and
removed from service transmission equipment the ownership of which was at issue
in a pending hearing. Id.
181 See supra note 129 (listing potentially applicable sanction provisions).
18 See Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2134 (1993). The court began its
discussion by stating that "[it] discern[ed] no basis for holding that the sanctioning
scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above." Id. The Court proceeded to concede, however, that "the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can
be limited by statute and rule." Id.
183 Id. It is inconsistent for the majority to begin by arguing that codified sanction mechanisms in no way displace inherent judicial power while concurrently
conceding that inherent power may very well be effectively limited under the circumstances.
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B. Inherent Power and the Erie Doctrine
The Chambers decision is inconsistent with Erie Doctrine
principles to the extent that Chambers may have been sanctioned for his initial bad-faith breach of contract.", Distracted by its efforts to broaden the scope of its -inherent authority
to sanction, the majority failed to appreciate that Chambers, to
some extent, was sanctioned for his initial bad-faith breach of
contract, a remedy not permitted by Louisiana substantive law.
When a district court exercises its diversity jurisdiction, it
must apply state substantive law, with choice of law principles
governing which state's substantive law will control.'85 Although application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at
times may directly affect the outcome of a case, they are considered procedural for Erie purposes.186 Unlike the Federal
Rules, however, the inherent power to sanction should not
automatically enjoy such a presumption. Although a district
court has the inherent authority to sanction litigants for abusive litigation practices, it must exercise due care not to violate
any substantive state policies.'87 When a court punishes conduct that affects a procedural aspect of the litigation, the principles that apply to the Federal Rules should govern.' Such
a standard, however, cannot justify the use of inherent power
in a manner that is inconsistent with state substantive law.
In Chambers,the petitioner argued that, through an indiscriminately broad use of its inherent powers, the district court
sanctioned him in part for his initial bad-faith refusal to abide
by the Agreement's terms.'89 According to Chambers, the im-
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For a discussion of the Supreme Court decision as consistent with Erie, see

Procedural Rules do not
Goodloe Partee, Comment, Procedure-Sanctions-Federal
Displace Inherent Powers of Court to Award Attorney's Fees for Bad Faith Conduct:
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 14 U. ARK. LIrLE RoCK L.J. 107 (1991).
1.. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the State.").
1" Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468, 472-74 (1965) (indicating that the "outcome determinative" test cannot be read without considering the twin aims of Erie:
discouraging of forum shopping and avoiding the inequitable administration of
laws).
187 See Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2148-40 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465 (noting that "federal courts are to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law").
1.. See Brief for the Petitioner on the Merits at 26, Chambers v. NASCO, 111
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position of sanctions for such a purpose violated Erie principles
because Louisiana law did not permit the awarding of punitive
damages for even a bad-faith breach of contract, unless the
contract so stipulated.190 Chambers placed much weight on
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Alyeska where it noted the
potential limitations of a court applying its inherent powers
when jurisdiction was premised on diversity of citizenship:
A very different situation is presented when a federal court sits
in a diversity case. "[I]n an ordinary diversity case where the state
law does not run counter to a valid federal statute or rule of court,
and usually it will not, state law denying the right to attorney!s]fees
or giving a right thereto, which reflects a substantial policy of the
state, should be followed." 9 '

Chambers argued that in his case, this same reasoning would
require a holding in his favor on this point given Louisiana's
legislative mandate prohibiting the imposition of sanctions for
bad-faith breaches of contract, a view he interpreted to be
widely accepted in many jurisdictions.1 92 The Chambers
S. Ct. 2123 (1991) (No. 90-256) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
" Id. at 27-28. For a discussion of Louisiana's prohibition on the imposition of
sanctions for even a bad-faith breach of contract, see generally International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988) (punitive damages
are not allowed under Louisiana law) (citing Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882 (La.
1980)); Killebrew v. Abbott Labs., 359 So. 2d 1275, 1278 (La. 1978) (holding that
defendant was not liable for attorneys' fees for its alleged arbitrary and capricious
failure to pay benefits under disability plan); Lancaster v. Petroleum Corp. of Del.,
491 So. 2d 768, 779 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (refusing to award attorneys' fees for badfaith breach of contract).
" Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 258 n.31 (1975)
(quoting 6 JAMES MOORE ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 54.77[2], at 1712-13 (2d ed.
1974)) (emphasis added).
" See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 189, at 11-15; see also Chambers v.
NASCO, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2137-38 (1991).
Chambers cited a veritable plethora of case law that appeared to support his
position. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 189, at 12-15; see, e.g., First State Underwriters Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. v. Travelers Insur., 803 F.2d
1308, 1317 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding that Pennsylvania's "bad faith" exception governed the award of attorneys' fees in a diversity contract action); Nepera Chem.,
Inc. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 794 F.2d 688, 694-95 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying District of Columbia law in a diversity action to determine whether attorneys' fees
could be awarded as punishment for bad faith, vexatious, wanton or oppressive
behavior); Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1508 (l1th
Cir. 1985) (rejecting a claim for attorneys' fees predicated upon the "bad faith" of
the plaintiff in the way it "initiated and conducted" the litigation because the "bad
faith exception . . . is not recognized in the Florida jurisprudence"); Lewis v. S. L.
& E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 773 (2d Cir. 1980) (reversing an award of attorneys' fees

1993]

RULE 11 LOST

1263

Court, however, disagreed. The Court concluded that Chambers had misinterpreted the limitations imposed by footnote
thirty-one of the Alyeska opinion which, it concluded, "applie[d]
only to fee-shifting rules that embody a substantive policy,
such as a statute which permit[ed] a prevailing party in certain classes of litigation to recover fees." 9 ' But the Court
failed to recognize that if Chambers was in fact partially sanctioned for his initial and permissible breach of contract, then
the district court used its inherent powers to fashion a federal
substantive remedy that directly conflicted with substantive
state law.
The district court's evident indignation surrounding the
complete span of Chambers' conduct strongly suggests that he
was at least partially sanctioned for his initial breach of contract. The district court emphasized the initial breach of contract when discussing its decision to impose sanctions representing all of NASCO's attorneys' fees.'94 The court noted
that "[i]t would be impossible within the limits of this opinion
to develop an accurate picture of this massive and absolutely
unnecessary lawsuit forced on NASCO by Chambers' arbitrary
and arrogant refusal to honor and perform this perfectly legal
and enforceable contract." 95 Again mentioning the underlying contract that gave rise to the litigation, the court noted
that Chambers had refused to file his portion of the FCC application in knowing violation of the Agreement.'96 Importantly,
Justices Kennedy and Scalia, dissenting, both voiced their
concern that the district court partially sanctioned Chambers
for his initial breach of contract.197 Viewed in their totality,
the opinions strongly suggest that the district court took into
account Chambers' initial culpability regarding his breach of

made on the basis of the bad faith exception because New York law did not authorize the award). In deciding Chambers as it did, the Supreme Court has rejected the reasoning of these many cases, all of which relied on prior Supreme Court
precedent. These circuit cases advance the appropriate position.
133 Chambers, 111 S. Ct. at 2136.
13 NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio Inc., 124 F.R.D. 120, 125-27, 143
(W.D. La. 1989).
1" Id. at 136; see also id. at 143 ("Chambers arbitrarily and without legal cause
refused to perform, forcing NASCO to bring its suit for specific performance.").
at 125.
193 Id.
13 Chambers v. NASCO, 111 S. Ct 2123, 2147 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
id. at 2141 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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contract when assessing sanctions in the form of attorneys'
fees.
The district court's failure to reduce the assessment of
sanctions against Chambers by an amount representing
NASCO's initial expenses for bringing this suit for the breach
of contract also suggests that the court may have abused its
discretion. In assessing inherent power sanctions against
Chambers, the district court awarded NASCO an amount representing all of its legal fees, costs and expenses incurred in
connection with all matters relating to this litigation.1 98 But
in reaching this figure, the court failed to indicate that it was
taking into account Louisiana's prohibition against imposing
punitive damages for bad-faith breach of contract." When
viewed in conjunction with the court's expressed indignation
surrounding the circumstances of the litigation, the extent of
sanctions imposed strongly suggests that Chambers was punished partly for his initial refusal to abide by the terms of the
Agreement.
Application of the inherent power to sanction raises troubling concerns regarding the availability and use of such a
broad and relatively undefined equitable remedy, especially
when a Louisiana state court could not have sanctioned such
conduct. Where a court chooses to punish a litigant under the
guise of its inherent powers, it must not violate state substantive law. To permit a district court to use its inherent powers
to produce a result proscribed by the law it is applying would
be to confer on it the power "to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing." 0 0° Just as the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not be used in a manner
that "abridge[s], enlarge[s], or modifie[s] any substantive
right," a court may not impose an ad hoc procedural sanction
that violates Erie.2"' In Chambers the sanctions levied
against Chambers for his initial breach of contract were not
procedural, but rather resulted in the imposition of a substantive remedy that was clearly inconsistent with Louisiana con198 See NASCO, 124 F.R.D. at 133-43.
19

See supra note 190 and accompanying text.

20 See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (a feder-

al court may not invoke the supervisory power to circumvent the mandate under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52).
201 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
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tract law.
IV.

A SUGGESTED APPROACH

The inherent power, founded in the equity and common
law powers of courts, ordinarily should not prevail over statutory provisions." 2 Courts are vested with inherent powers,,
authority created out of necessity, so that they may carry out
those functions appropriately associated with the judicial domain.03 This power to act, however, exists only where necessity dictates-that is, where statutes and rules are silent.2
Thus, where codified sanction provisions provide an adequate
means by which to regulate conduct, authority to act under the
guise of inherent power is not only unnecessary, but improper.
Given that inherent power, like its criminal law supervisory
power counterpart, "is just another name for the power of
courts to make common law when statutes and rules do not
address a particular topic,"2 5 resort to principles of equitable
authority should not be a substitute for sound legal reasoning.
Courts may exercise their inherent power to sanction conduct not regulated by codified sanction provisions, but not in a
manner inconsistent with applicable rules or statutes.0 6 Exemplary of the proper approach that a court should take is
Strandell v. Jackson County."' In that case the Seventh Circuit was faced with the issue of whether a district court could
require litigants to participate in a nonbinding summary jury
trial under Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court sought to compel both parties to participate
22 Cf. In re Dakota Indus., 131 B.R. 437 (Bankr. S.D. 1991) ("[s]pecific statutes
control over general statutes, and both over case law").
o See supra notes 11-42 and accompanying text.
204 See id.; Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (noting that "inherent power" is not governed "by rule or statute but by the control necessarily
vested in courts to .. .achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases").
20 Soo Line R.R. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R., 840 F.2d 546, 551 (7th
Cir. 1988); cf United States v. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325, 328-29 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that supervisory power means that courts have the power to "announce
new rules that promote the administration of justice, even though neither Constitution nor statute requires such rules").
2" See Landau & Clearly, Ltd. v. Hribar Trucking, Inc., 867 F.2d 996, 1002
(7th Cir. 1989) (courts may not exercise inherent authority inconsistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
207 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1987).
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in such a proceeding and entered a criminal contempt judgment against plaintiffs counsel when he refused to do so."'
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court was
without the authority to compel such action."°9 While recognizing that "district court[s] no doubt ha[ve] substantial inherent power to control and to manage [their] docket[s]," the Seventh Circuit warned that such "power, must, of course, be
exercised in a manner that is in harmony with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure."21 The court went on to note that
th[e]se rules are the product of a careful process of study and reflection designed to take "due cognizance both of the need for expedition
of cases and the protection of individual rights." That process, set
forth in the Rules Enabling Act, also reflects the joint responsibility
of the legislative and judicial branches of government in striking the
delicate balance between these competing concerns. Therefore, in
those areas of trial practice where the Supreme Court and the Congress, acting together, have addressed the appropriate balance between the needs for judicial efficiency and the rights of the individual litigant, innovation by the individual judicial officer must conform
to that balance.2"1'

The Strandell court's approach to this issue achieves a delicate
balance between a court's desire to regulate the conduct of
litigants and its obligation to abide by the language of codified
sanction provisions. Thus, where a provision such as Rule 11
requires a court to impose sanctions, a court should not be free
to ignore its mandate by resorting to its inherent powers.
Of course, a slightly different approach may be required
when a codified provision does not mandate its use, but rather
allows the court to exercise some degree of discretion." 2 In
such cases, absent a contrary legislative intent or a result that
would be demonstrably at odds with such legislative intent, the
court should exercise its discretion in choosing between applying an inherent power or a codified provision sanction." 3 In

208
219
210
211

Id.

at 885.

Id. at 887.
Id. at 886.
Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), reprinted in 1958

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3023, 3026).
212See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988) (courts have discretion to impose sanctions
on any attorney or person who multiplies court proceedings 'unreasonably and
vexatiously").
213 On April 22, 1993, the Supreme Court submitted to Congress amendments

1993]

RULE 11 LOST

1267

all other cases, however, the court should resort to an applicable codified provision.
In Chambers, inherent power sanctions were imposed to
cover the complete range of the defendant's conduct because it
was more convenient to do so, but not because it was necessary
under the circumstances. Both the district court and the Supreme Court agreed that some of Chambers' conduct-although
some might argue most-was sanctionable under Rule 11 and
section 1927. In addition, the Federal Rules as well as a multitude of other statutes provide a rather comprehensive arsenal
through which the district court could have sanctioned Chambers.214 If the district court had first turned to these codified
sanction provisions, as Justice Kennedy's dissent recommended, Chambers would not have escaped punishment.215 Rather,
he would have received such punishment as would have been
appropriate under those provisions. Any conduct that the district considered to be sanctionable, but which could not be punished through the use of a codified provision could then be
sanctioned under its inherent power if it made the requisite

to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 11, which became effective
on December 1, 1993. See Transmittal Letter from Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Apr. 22,
1993), reprinted in 113 S. Ct. (Preface) 477 (1993). In its present form, Rule 11
now permits and no longer requires a court to impose sanctions when it finds a
violation. Rule 11 now provides in pertinent part:
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court
may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (effective Dec. 1, 1993) (second emphasis added).
For the purposes of this Comment and consistent with the approach suggested, the practical effect of this most recent amendment to Rule 11 should be to
give district courts greater discretion only in determining whether to impose sanctions. In making its determination whether to sanction conduct that violates Rule
11, a court should not rely on its inherent power to the exclusion of the Rule. A
cours reliance on its inherent power in such circumstances would still be inappropriate unless relying on Rule 11 could cause a result that was directly at odds
with the Rule's purpose. Because such unique circumstances will likely surface
only in rare cases, the proper focus should be on applying the Rule as amended
and determining whether sanctions are warranted under the circumstances.
214 See supra note 129. See generally JOSEPH, supra note 4, § 1, at 2-5 (discussing several sanctioning mechanisms, including Rules 11, 26, 37 as well as 28
U.S.C. §§ 1912 & 1927 (1992)).
21' See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
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finding of bad faith. Such an approach would require a district
court to resort to inherent power sanctions only in those instances where such reliance is necessary, and not just convenient. Moreover, the court would be required to analyze and
explain fully the means by which it imposes sanctions, something to which the parties as well as reviewing courts and
courts later relying on the decision are entitled.
Inherent powers are the exception rather than the rule
and their application should require a special justification in
each case. Thus, district courts should recognize and apply the
following three-part approach when considering whether to act
under their inherent powers to sanction for bad-faith conduct.
First, a district court's equitable authority to sanction for bad
faith is most legitimate when faced with an absence of any
statutory or rule-based authority that applies to the specific
sanction-worthy conduct at hand.
Second, when a court is faced with conduct that may be
sanctioned through a discretionary codified provision, a determination first should be made as to whether the application of
this provision is appropriate under the circumstances. For
example, applying section 1927 sanctions in Chambers would
have resulted in the levying of fines against Chambers' attorneys, something that the district court determined would be
inappropriate given the high degree of control Chambers evidently exercised over his counsel.216 However, if Chambers'
attorneys were directly responsible for concocting and implementing the scheme to defraud the district court, it may very
well have been an abuse of the court's discretion to levy inherent power sanctions against counsel to the exclusion of
highly applicable codified provisions such as Rule 11 or section
1927. Similarly, if section 1927 did not permit the imposition
of attorneys' fees as a component of those assessed costs, then
the use of inherent power may have been appropriate, perhaps
even absent a finding of bad faith.
Finally, the inherent power to sanction is at its lowest
legitimacy, and arguably is non-existent, when a court is faced
with sanctionable conduct that directly falls within the ambit
of a codified provision. In such a case, the district court should
216 NASCO v. Calcasieu Television and Radio, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 1120, 139 (W.D.

La. 1989).
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apply the rule or statute, unless the provision explicitly allows
for the application of inherent power sanctions.
CONCLUSION

Chambers exemplifies the risks that a federal court takes
when it resorts to its inherent powers to sanction conduct that
is clearly covered under codified sanction provisions. It not
only risks disregarding the very nature of inherent power as
well as violating longstanding principles of statutory interpretation, but its misapplication of such a broad power may produce a result that directly conflicts with state law. The inherent powers of federal courts exist so that the judiciary may
continue to regulate the conduct of litigants when faced with
the absence of statutory authority. Because inherent power is
based on such a necessity, however, where Congress or the
Supreme Court in their rulemaking capacities have provided
courts with codified provisions through which to sanction the
conduct of litigants, resort to inherent power is unnecessary.
Indeed, in such a circumstance, the equitable authority to act
arguably no longer exists. More importantly, though, courts
should be careful not to thwart the purpose of rules and statutes that were promulgated to regulate the very type of conduct at issue. Ultimately, courts should strive to limit the use
of their inherent power to punishing only that conduct which
falls within the interstices where rules and statutes are silent.
John Papachristos

